The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its Relevance to Treaties

By Bakampa Brian Baryaguma

[Dip. Law (First Class)–LDC; Cert. Oil & Gas–Mak; LLB (Hons)–Mak]

bakampasenior@gmail.com; www.huntedthinker.blogspot.ug

April 2022

1.                  Introduction

1.1.            Definition of Treaty

Literally speaking, a treaty is an agreement made and signed between nations.^[1] In its literal sense, a treaty can be formal / written or it can be informal / unwritten (hence oral, since it is inconceivable that a treaty can be made otherwise, for instance by gestures).

However, in international law and relations, a treaty is understood only formally i.e. in writing. This is because Article 2 (1) (a) of the 1969 Vienna Convention (hereinafter “the Vienna Convention”) defines a treaty as, “… an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation”. The Vienna Convention dictates that a treaty must be in written form. Hence, an unwritten agreement between nations is not a treaty.

1.2.            About the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (hereinafter “the NPT”), was opened for signature on 1 July 1968, entered into force on 5 March 1970^[2] and extended indefinitely on 11 May 1995 by the Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.^[3]

A total of 191 States have joined the Treaty, including the original five nuclear-weapon States i.e. China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. According to the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, “More countries have ratified the NPT than any other arms limitation and disarmament agreement, a testament to the Treaty’s significance.”^[4] The United Nations Security Council described the NPT as the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.^[5] The Treaty is generally regarded as an essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament.^[6]

The NPT rose out of the need to limit the spread of nuclear weapons,^[7] through spread of technological know-how, nuclear materials and specialized equipment. These weapons are the most powerful weaponry ever produced by man;^[8] and the deadliest too.^[9] With their discovery, “... human destructive power reached a new, suicidal level, surpassing previous limits to all but unimaginable degree.”^[10] The monstrous twin bombings of Japan’s Hiroshima and Nagasaki cities in 1945,^[11] demonstrated the weapons’ disastrous capability. Having killed more people than any other weapon before and after, they made history.^[12] Nuclear weapons escalated conflicts and threatened global peace and security.^[13] Nuclear-weapon states started bullying non-nuclear-weapon states, threatening them with nuclear bombardment.^[14] Other states pursued a balance of terror policy,^[15] involving acquiring the macabre weapons, to guarantee their security, economic stability and political prestige. The world was said to be: “... lurching from crisis to crisis, where the only light at the end of the tunnel is a nuclear fireball;”^[16] brought to a nuclear tipping point;^[17] facing dangers of the most titanic proportions,^[18] whereby with “... further transfers of nuclear weapons, accidental and catalytic wars would become more likely, and nations would drift into “a nightmare region in which man’s powers of destruction are constantly increasing and his control over these powers is constantly diminishing.””^[19]

Consequently, the carnage and terror of nuclear weapons necessitated a nuclear-free world,^[20] where nuclear arms are effectively managed. Led by the United Nations Secretary-General,^[21] states embarked on negotiations to achieve this world.^[22] The negotiations resulted into a negotiated settlement that is famously and popularly known as the grand bargain, which is immortalized in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1968. The NPT categorized member states and on this basis obligations were imposed.

1.                  State Categorization under the NPT

Two categories of states were identified:

(a)                Those which had manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or device before 1 January 1967 – termed nuclear-weapon states;^[23] and

(b)               Those which have not manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or device – termed non-nuclear-weapon states.

2.                  Pillars of the NPT

The Treaty rests on three interrelated and mutually reinforcing pillars: non-proliferation, peaceful use of nuclear energy and disarmament.^[24] These were pledges made by the states, which establish a balance of obligations undertaken by them, to ensure non-proliferation and move toward a nuclear weapons-free world.^[25] Under the NPT:

(a)                Nuclear-weapon states commit to–

(i)                             Early cessation of nuclear weapons production;^[26]

(ii)                           General and complete disarmament;^[27] and

(iii)                         Denial of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon states.^[28]

(b)               Non-nuclear-weapon states commit to–

(i)                 Refraining from manufacturing nuclear weapons;^[29] and

(j)                 Never to seek, receive or acquire them from nuclear-weapon states.^[30]

2.                  Relevance of the NPT to Treaties

The nuclear non-proliferation treaty is relevant to treaties in so far as it has facilitated their making or informs and influences their contents, processes and outcomes. The NPT has had this relevance in many instances, such as the following.

1.                  Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) was a bilateral treaty between the United States of America and the Soviet Union (currently Russia) on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms.^[31] START was signed by the two nuclear powers in two limbs and so it is conveniently categorized into START I and START II.

(a)                START I

START I was signed on 31 July 1991, entered into force on 5 December 1994 and expired on 5 December 2009.^[32] It was proposed by US President Ronald Reagan on 9 May 1982.^[33] The Treaty, “… was indispensable in creating a framework that ensured predictability and stability for deep reductions.”^[34]

START I barred its signatories from deploying more than 6000 nuclear warheads and a total of 1600 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and bombers.^[35] It oversaw, “… the largest and most complex arms control treaty in history, and its final implementation in late 2001 resulted in the removal of about 80% of all strategic nuclear weapons then in existence.”^[36] Reductions of nuclear weapons were completed by the deadline of 5 December 2001, seven years after the Treaty entered in force and maintained for another eight years till 2009.^[37] Verification was done by on-site inspections and shared missile telemetry.^[38] Both the United States and Russia continued reduction efforts even after reaching the START limits.^[39]

(b)               START II

START II was signed on 3 January 1993,^[40] but it never entered into force^[41] and Russia repudiated the agreement on June 14, 2002.^[42] The purpose of START II was to–

(i)                 eliminate intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMS), particularly heavy ICBMs and all other multiple-warhead (MIRVed) ICBMS; and

(ii)               reduce the total number of strategic nuclear weapons deployed by both countries, by two-thirds below pre-START levels.^[43]

The Treaty was to be implemented in two phases. In the first phase, each side had to reduce its total deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 3800-4250; by the end of the second and final phase, each side must have reduced its total deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 3000-3500, of which none may be on MIRVed ICBMS, including heavy ICBMS; only ICBMs carrying a single-warhead would be allowed; no more than 1700-1750 deployed warheads may be on submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMS), which may be MIRVed.^[44]

START I was quite significant because it was the first treaty to provide for deep reductions of US and Soviet / Russian strategic nuclear weapons.

2.                  The Lisbon Protocol to the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

The Lisbon Protocol to the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (hereinafter “the Lisbon Protocal”), was concluded on 23 May 1992.^[45] It was signed by representatives of Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, with the Protocol recognizing the four states as successors of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and all of them assuming obligations of the Soviet Union under the START I treaty.^[46]

The background to the Lisbon Protocol is that in December 1991, the Soviet Union dissolved, leaving four independent states in possession of strategic nuclear weapons: Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan.^[47] Russia was the natural successor of the Soviet Union and so was indisputably entitled to all its rights, privileges and property, including nuclear weapons. Concern however, was on Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan which also inherited more than 3000 strategic nuclear weapons, as well as at least 3000 tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons from the Soviet Union.^[48] The worry was that those weapons might be more vulnerable to possible sale or theft once left in the new break-away countries and that the collapse of the Soviet Union would leave four nuclear-weapon states instead of just one.^[49] The United States and Russia reached a solution to this complex problem by engaging Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine in a series of talks that led to the Lisbon Protocol, which agreement made all five states party to START I, made Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan forswore nuclear arms, committed them to return their nuclear weapons to Russia and accede to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states.^[50] All Soviet nuclear weapons were eventually transferred to Russia by the end of 1996.^[51]

The major contribution of the Lisbon Protocol in the nuclear discourse is that it eliminated nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union states of Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan.

3.                  Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty

The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) was signed on 24 May 2002 between the United States of America and Russia, mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.^[52] Also known as “the Moscow Treaty”, SORT entered into force on 1 June 2003.^[53]

Under Article I of the Treaty, Russia and America undertook to reduce and limit strategic nuclear warheads by 31 December 2012, at which date the aggregate number of such warheads would not exceed 1700-2200 for each state. The Article permitted each state to determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms, based on the established aggregate limit for the number of such warheads.

There are concerns that SORT has numerous weaknesses for instance that: it does not specify which warheads are to be reduced or how reductions should be made; does not limit how many strategic warheads the United States and Russia can keep in storage or reserve; does not obligate destruction of warheads or delivery vehicles; does not have interim reduction levels or sub-limits; does not regulate or constrain how deployed warheads are fielded; and that it lacks provisions for assessing compliance.^[54] But I submit that these gaps in the Treaty are internally and effectively cured by Article II which states that, “The Parties agree that the START Treaty remains in force in accordance with its terms.” START I addressed these matters and although it technically expired on 5 December 2009, Article II of SORT effectively extended its lifespan.

It has been observed that, “According to official and unofficial reports, both sides have implemented the treaty smoothly. … the two nations began, in 2006, to hold discussions about the 2009 expiration of the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which contains monitoring provisions that aid with verification of the Moscow Treaty.”^[55] As the reported discussions took place, the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty lapsed on 5 February 2011, when another START treaty entered into force.^[56]

4.                  Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms

This treaty’s title is a mouthful. Perhaps this explains why it is commonly referred to as the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, popularly abbreviated as New START. It was signed in Prague on 8 April 2010,^[57] by the United States of America and Russia. The two states were, “Committed to the fulfillment of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968, and to the achievement of the historic goal of freeing humanity from the nuclear threat.”^[58] The Treaty entered into force on 5 February 2011, replacing START I treaty of 1991 that expired on 5 December 2009 and superseded the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty of 24 May 2002,^[59] which terminated when New START entered into force.^[60] Under Article XIV (2), it was declared that the Treaty shall remain in force for 10 years unless superseded earlier by subsequent agreement. After the 10 years expired, the parties agreed on 3 February 2021, to extend the Treaty by five years, until 5 February 2026.^[61]

New START continues the bipartisan process of verifiably reducing US and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals and is the first verifiable US-Russian nuclear arms control treaty to take effect since START I in 1994.^[62] Under Articles I and II of the Treaty, the parties undertake to each reduce and limit, within seven years after entry into force of the Treaty, its strategic offensive arms, ICBMs and ICBM launchers, SLBMs and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads and heavy bomber nuclear armaments to 700, for deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs and deployed heavy bombers; 1550, for warheads on deployed ICBMs, warheads on deployed SLBMs and nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers; and lastly 800, for deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, deployed and non-deployed SLBM launchers and deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers. Under Article XIII, the covenanting parties commit not to assume any international obligations or undertakings that would conflict with the Treaty’s provisions as well as not to transfer strategic offensive arms that are subject to the Treaty to third parties.

The New START is vital and timely for nuclear non-proliferation efforts because, “New START’s verification regime includes relevant parts of START I as well as new provisions to cover items not previously monitored. … Even so, the verification system has been simplified to make it cheaper and easier to operate than START and to reflect new strategic realities. New START monitoring has also been designed to reflect updated treaty limitations.”^[63]

The foregoing are the most prominent and outstanding instances of the relevance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to treaties. But there are other less impactful treaties which, nevertheless, made important strides and contribution to efforts of non-proliferation. For example, there is the Intermediate-Range-Nuclear Forces Treaty of December 1987 which is significant because it was the first time that United States and Soviet leaders agreed to destroy a whole class of weapons systems.^[64] Then, there is the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 which the United States and the Soviet Union negotiated as part of an effort to control their arms race in nuclear weapons, reasoning that limiting defensive systems would reduce the need to build more or new offensive weapons to overcome any defense that the other might deploy.^[65]

3.                  Conclusion

The 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was a game changer in the nuclear non-proliferation regime. There is consensus among scholars and experts that, “… the NPT, on balance, has been enormously successful.”^[66] Part of the Treaty’s success is due to the fact that it has provided impetus for states and other international actors to vigorously pursue containment and elimination of the deadly nuclear weapons. The various treaties cited in this essay, some of which point directly to and invoke the authority of the NPT, are a testament to the Treaty’s absolute relevance.

 

REFERENCES

1.                  A.S. Hornby, A.P. Cowie and A.C. Gimson, Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of Current English (1983), at 939.

2.                  International Atomic Energy Agency, ‘Information Circular No. 140 (INFCIRC/140)’ (22 April 1970).

3.                  United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, ‘Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)’ (2022). Accessed online at https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/#:~:text=The%20NPT%20is%20a%20landmark,and%20general%20and%20complete%20disarmament., on 13 April 2022, at 16:57 GMT.

4.                  Ibid.

5.                  Security Council Resolution 1887 (2009); see, Preamble thereto.

6.                  United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, supra note 3.

7.                  Henry Sokolski, ‘What Does the History of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Tell Us About Its Future?’, in Henry Sokolski (ed) Reviewing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (2010) 27, at 27.

8.                  See, ibid., at 43.

9.                  George P Schultz et al., ‘Toward a Nuclear-Free World’ (2008).

10.              William H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power (1982), at 360.

11.              Zhores Medvedev, ‘Stalin and the Atomic Bomb’, in Roy Medvedev & Zhores Medvedev, The Unknown Stalin: His Life, Death, and Legacy (2003) 121, at 132, states that by order of President Harry Truman, the American air force, exploded the atomic bomb over Hiroshima on 6 August, 1945; the next day, 7 August 1945, a second one was dropped over Nagasaki.

12.              According to Zhores Medvedev, ibid., the atomic bombs killed between 200,000-300,000 people.

13.              Henry Sokolski, supra note 7, at 32-33, reports that on 17 October 1958, Ireland offered a draft resolution concerning the “Further Dissemination of Nuclear Weapons” before the First Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations, addressing the possibility that “an increase in the number of states possessing nuclear weapons may occur, aggravating international tensions” and making disarmament “more difficult.” The draft resolution recommended that the General Assembly establishes an ad hoc committee to study the dangers inherent in the further dissemination of nuclear weapons. The resolution was however, withdrawn on 31 October 1958, when it became clear that many states were not yet ready to endorse the initiative.

But as stated at page 48, reading the Treaty today, one finds that, “... the original bargain of the Irish resolutions of the late 1950s and early 1960s is present in the final version of NPT. Indeed, Articles 1 and 2, which prohibit the direct or indirect transfer and receipt of nuclear weapons, nuclear explosives, or control over such devices, read very much like the original Irish resolutions themselves. In Article 3, the treaty also calls on parties to accept and negotiate a system of safeguards that would prevent “diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” Finally, the treaty makes it clear in Article 4 that parties to the NPT could exercise their right to develop peaceful nuclear energy only “in conformity with Articles I and II.””

14.              Professor Dingli Shen, in his week 7 lecture on Nuclear Arms, a part of the global civics lecture series of the Global Civics Academy, states that the American government repeatedly threatened mainland China with the use of nuclear weapons, which prompted the latter to acquire them as well. The good professor submits that the American hegemony of nuclear weapons made the world unsafe and unstable, such that other states had to develop them in order to counter American aggression. Thus, for example, after China acquired a nuclear weapon, the American government has never threatened mainland China with the use of nuclear weapons. He states further that although America still has a programme to use nuclear weapons against mainland China, it (America) does not speak of that programme – and that is the difference.

These threats became such a big issue of international concern that in 1995, each of the original five nuclear-weapon states – China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America – had to give statements, noted by United Nations Security Council Resolution 984 (1995), in which they give security assurances against the use of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon state parties to the NPT. In 2009, the UN Security Council, by SC Resolution 1887 (2009), affirmed that such security assurances strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

15.              William H. McNeill, supra note 10, at 368, recalls that the balance of terror policy, “... arose in the decade after 1957, as the [United States and USSR] installed hundreds of long-range missiles and so became capable of destroying each other’s cities in a matter of minutes.” The policy was in response to the highly armed, militarily charged and politically unpredictable environment in which states operated. Hence, more countries obtained the weapons; and others are still trying to acquire them up to now.

This policy is closely related to the finite deterrence nuclear theory, which was originally innovated by France. Henry Sokolski, supra note 7, at 41, states that according to this theory, “... smaller nations could keep larger nuclear powers from threatening them militarily by acquiring a small number of nuclear weapons of their own. With their limited nuclear arsenal, the smaller nations might not be able to prevail in war against a larger power but could effectively “tear an arm off” by targeting the larger nation’s key cities, and thus deter such nations from ever attacking.”

16.              Kevin D. Paulson, Coming to Terms (1985), at 11.

17.              George P Schultz et al., supra note 9.

18.              Henry Sokolski, supra note 7, at 40.

19.              Ibid., at 34-35.

20.              As described by George P Schultz et al., supra note 9.

21.              By 1962, the UN Secretary General had embarked on an inquiry about the conditions under which non-nuclear-weapon states “might be willing to enter into specific undertakings to refrain” from acquiring weapons. Henry Sokolski, supra note 7, at 41-48 gives a precise account of the negotiations leading to the conclusion of the grand bargain and the enactment of the NPT. Particularly at pages 41-42, he states that, “Sixty-two nations replied, most of them wanting specific neighbors or all the states within their region to foreswear acquiring nuclear weapons as a condition for their doing likewise. Other nations, such as Italy, wanted the nuclear powers to halt their nuclear buildup. Meanwhile, the three nuclear powers that answered the inquiry indicated that general and complete disarmament was the best solution.”

22.              Eldon V. C. Greenberg, ‘Peaceful Nuclear Energy and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty’, in Henry Sokolski (ed) supra note 6, at 110, states that there was need, “... to establish a comprehensive, loophole-free agreement primarily aimed at enhancing security.”

23.              Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1968), Article IX (3). These are China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America.

24.              Report of the US Delegation to the 2010 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference, at 4.

The term non-proliferation refers to control of nuclear weapons. It means first, imposition of quota ceilings on quantity control i.e. not building more nuclear weapons, including restraint from further spread or acquisition of them, to or by those who don’t have them; and second, quality control i.e. not building better nuclear weapons, by those who have them. As stated at page 6 of the report, the norm of non-proliferation, “... includes the framework of legal restrictions, safeguards, export controls, international cooperation, and other mechanisms that help to prevent proliferation,” at the heart of which lies, “... the international consensus that the further spread of nuclear weapons would weaken all states’ security, as well as global and regional stability ...”.

The term disarmament, on the other hand, denotes reduction of nuclear weapons.

The NPT permits peaceful use of nuclear energy and acknowledges the right of all states to benefit from international cooperation in this area. Hence, as stated by Eldon V. C. Greenberg, supra note 22, at 113, “The UN General Assembly, in considering the final Treaty document and commending it to member states for ratification, specifically stated that it was: Convinced that, pursuant to the provisions of the Treaty, all signatories have the right to engage in research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and will be able to acquire source and special fissionable materials, as well as equipment for the processing, use and production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes.”

As noted at pages 5-6 of the US Delegation’s report, these three pillars are mutually reinforcing in the sense that, “An effective nonproliferation regime whose members comply with their obligations provides an essential foundation for progress on disarmament and makes possible greater cooperation on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. With the right to access the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology comes the responsibility of nonproliferation. Progress on disarmament reinforces efforts to strengthen the nonproliferation regime and to enforce compliance with obligations, thereby also facilitating peaceful nuclear cooperation.”

25.              Leonard Weiss, ‘Nuclear-Weapon States and the Grand Bargain’ (2003).

26.              Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1968), Article VI. Leonard Weiss, supra note 25, recalls that the addition of Article VI to the treaty blunted attacks by India and others that the early proposals of the NPT were unacceptably discriminatory in favour of the five nuclear-weapon states and allowed the Treaty to go forward, albeit without the Indians, who would not give up their right to make nuclear weapons. That the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 was predicated, in part, on assurances of continued commitment by the nuclear-weapon states to Art. VI.

27.              Ibid. These states are committed to abandoning their nuclear weapons eventually. As Professor Dingli Shen, supra note 14, says, this is because if the holders of nuclear weapons decided to permanently hold them, it would be very hard to make the world permanently nuclear free.

But there are states, particularly India, Israel and Pakistan, which manufactured and exploded nuclear weapons subsequent to the Treaty. These are unaccounted for since they do not fall under any specific category under the Treaty. One would be forgiven for tempting to think that they bear no obligations thereunder. It is submitted however, that since law abhors a vacuum, these states carry the same obligations as the original five nuclear-weapon states.

28.              Ibid., Article I. This is a non-transfer pledge and as Leonard Weiss, supra note 25 says, “The obligations contained in Article I of the NPT are among the most critical elements of the current nonproliferation regime because, without outside assistance, would-be proliferators, even if relatively advanced technologically, are hard-pressed to succeed in their plans. Indeed, the history of proliferation tells us that every country that has decided to make nuclear weapons since the end of World War II received assistance in its nuclear endeavor either as a result of scientific collaboration with the United States or other states with nuclear weapons or via espionage. The Soviet Union’s first weapon was at least partially assisted by espionage at the Manhattan Project, and the Soviets in turn provided important assistance to the Chinese program. The French and British programs were assisted by their collaboration with the United States on the Manhattan Project. France made a conscious decision in 1956 to give Israel the means to acquire the bomb, and Israel in turn provided some assistance to the French program and perhaps to the South African program as well, possibly in return for South African nuclear materials. The Indian program was substantially aided by the unwitting assistance of Canada and the United States. The Pakistani program proceeded from theft of design plans for a European nuclear enrichment plant, assistance from China, and a substantial clandestine worldwide purchasing program for the technology and components to complete the needed infrastructure to make weapons.”

29.              Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1968), Article II.

30.              Ibid. This is a non-receipt pledge. These commitments stem from those of nuclear-weapon states to abandon their nuclear arsenals. Henry Sokolski, supra note 7, at 29-30, describes this as a deal, whereby “... forswearing nuclear weapons required a quid pro quo—i.e., a requirement for the superpowers to take effective measures to end the nuclear arms race ...”. Equally so, Professor Dingli Shen, supra note 14, sees it in more or less the same light: a need for a balance if non-nuclear-weapon states are to keep their non-nuclear status.

31.              Wikipedia, ‘START I’ (2022). Accessed online at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/START_I, on 15 April 2022, at 05:00 GMT.

32.              Ibid.

33.              Ibid.

34.              Arms Control Association, ‘START I at a Glance’ (2022). Accessed online at https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/start1, on 15 April 2022, at 06:00 GMT.

35.              Wikipedia, START I, supra note 31.

36.              Ibid.

37.              Arms Control Association, START I, supra note 34.

38.              Ibid.

39.              Ibid.

40.              Robert Sherman, ‘Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II)’ FAS (2022). Accessed online at https://nuke.fas.org/control/start2/index.html#:~:text=The%20START-2%20Treaty%20was,Summit%20on%20June%2017%2C%201992. On 15 April 2022, at 08:34 GMT.

41.              Arms Control Association, START I, supra note 34.

42.              Arms Control Association, ‘The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) At a Glance’ (2017). Accessed online at https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/sort-glance#:~:text=The%20May%202002%20Strategic%20Offensive,day%2C%20December%2031%2C%202012, on 15 April 2022, at 11:08 GMT.

43.              Arms Control Association, START I, supra note 34.

44.              Ibid.

45.              Arms Control Association, ‘The Lisbon Protocol At a Glance’ (2020). Accessed online at https://www.armscontrol.org/node/3289, on 15 April 2022, at 09:30 GMT.

46.              Wikipedia, ‘Lisbon Protocol’ (2022). Accessed online at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lisbon_Protocol#:~:text=United%20States-,The%20Lisbon%20Protocol%20to%20the%201991%20Strategic%20Arms%20Reduction%20Treaty,under%20the%20START%20I%20treaty, on 15 April 2022, at 17:05 GMT.

47.              Arms Control Association, Lisbon Protocol, supra note 45.

48.              Ibid.

49.              Ibid.

50.              Ibid.

51.              Ibid.

52.              The text of the Treaty is available online at https://nuke.fas.org/control/sort/sort.htm. Accessed on 15 April 2022, at 11:53 GMT.

53.              Arms Control Association, SORT, supra note 42.

54.              Ibid.

55.              EveryCRSReport, ‘Nuclear Arms Control: The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty’ EveryCRSReport.com (2011). Accessed online at https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RL31448.html#:~:text=The%20U.S.%20Senate%20gave%20its,START%20Treaty%20entered%20into%20force, on 15 April 2022, at 12:52 GMT.

56.              Ibid.

57.              US Department of State, ‘New START: Treaty Text’. Accessed online at https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/newstart/c44126.htm, on 15 April 2022, at 13:26 GMT.

58.              See Preamble to the Treaty.

59.              Arms Control Association, ‘New START at a Glance’ (2022). Accessed online at https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/NewSTART, on 15 April 2022, at 13:33 GMT.

60.              In accordance with Article XIV (4) of New START which provides that the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions of 24 May 2002, shall terminate as of the date of New START’s entry into force.

61.              Arms Control Association, New START, supra note 59.

62.              Ibid.

63.              Ibid.

64.              Quizlet, ‘Chapter 31 Quiz’ (2022). Accessed online at https://quizlet.com/464765207/chapter-31-quiz-flash-cards/#:~:text=Why%20was%20the%20Intermediate-Range,whole%20class%20of%20weapons%20systems., on 15 April 2022, at 16:29 GMT.

65.              Arms Control Association, ‘The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty at a Glance’ (2020). Accessed online at https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/abmtreaty#:~:text=The%20United%20States%20and%20the%20Soviet%20Union%20negotiated%20the%20ABM,that%20the%20other%20might%20deploy., on 15 April 2022, at 16:19 GMT.

66.              Michael E. O’Hanlon et al., ‘Experts assess the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 50 years after it went into effect’ Brookings (2020). Accessed online at https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/03/03/experts-assess-the-nuclear-non-proliferation-treaty-50-years-after-it-went-into-effect/, on 12 April 2022, at 01:11 GMT.