Wednesday, 25 October 2017

Parliamentary Autonomy vis-à-vis the Exercise of Executive Power in Uganda: A Case Study of the Case of Brigadier Henry Tumukunde vs Attorney General, and the Electoral Commission

By Bakampa Brian Baryaguma

1.0  Brief Facts

The case of Brigadier Henry Tumukunde vs Attorney General, and the Electoral Commission,[1] was an appeal in the Supreme Court decided on 13th October, 2008. Briefly, the facts were that the appellant, Brig. Henry Tumukunde, was a member of the 7th Parliament, representing the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF). In 2005, a UPDF Forces Bill was tabled in parliament, some sections of which he opposed on the floor of parliament, before the relevant committee. He went on to make utterances on radio stations particularly Radio One.

This did not augur well with the President / Commander-in-Chief, who summoned him to a meeting of the UPDF High Command, on 27th May 2005, and ordered him (appellant) to resign his seat in parliament within 12 hours. The appellant wrote to the Speaker of Parliament, purporting to resign.
Thereafter, the Speaker, through the Clerk to Parliament, notified the Electoral Commission (EC) of a vacancy in parliament, following the appellant’s “resignation.” The EC organized by-elections to replace him. He was later arrested and charged before the UPDF’s General Court Martial.

Consequently, the appellant brought an action in the Constitutional Court, seeking inter alia an order halting his replacement in parliament, and a declaration that the directive to him to resign, and his eventual resignation, were unlawful. The court dismissed his petition, holding that he had lawfully, and validly, resigned from parliament. He appealed to the Supreme Court which, in a lead judgment by Justice Kanyeihamba, allowed the appeal, finding that his resignation from parliament was unlawful, and invalid.

1.1              Relevance of the Case to Constitutional Jurisprudence

This case is of great constitutional significance. It addresses a number of constitutional issues, more so the rights, privileges and immunities of Members of Parliament (MPs). It also addresses other issues like the right to freedom of speech, equality and freedom from discrimination, separation of powers, and checks and balances. The following discussion analyses these constitutional matters.

1.1.0        Privileges and Immunities of Members of Parliament

The gist of the case is the enjoyment and protection of the privileges, and immunities of parliament. The role of the Speaker is particularly highlighted here. The Constitution establishes the Parliament of Uganda.[2] Under A. 79, parliament is enjoined to make laws on any matter for the peace, order, development, and good governance of Uganda, to protect the Constitution, and promote the democratic governance of Uganda. In order to perform these duties sufficiently well, A. 97 provides for immunities, and privileges of Members of Parliament. To this end, the article empowers parliament to enact enabling laws.

Accordingly, Parliament passed the Parliamentary (Powers and Privileges) Act,[3] which provides that, ‘No civil or criminal proceedings may be instituted against any member for words spoken before, or written in a report to, Parliament or to a committee, or by reason of any matter or thing brought by the member in Parliament or a committee by petition, bill, motion or otherwise.’[4] The Speaker of Parliament is charged with the duty of ensuring that this is adhered to. In this case, the Speaker neglected this duty, which court interpreted as a breach of procedure and law.

The privileges, and immunities of MPs are not only to be found in statute law, but also in conventions, rules, and practices of Parliament. Justice Kanyeihamba traced some in the history of England, recalling that in 1642, King Charles I sought to arrest five MPs, and demanded that the Speaker (Lenthall) identifies them. In response to the request, the Speaker declined to identify them, saying that he had neither eyes to see, nor ears to hear, except as directed by parliament, whose servant he was.

1.1.1        Right to Freedom of Speech and Expression

Brigadier Tumukunde also pleaded that the UPDF’s action of restraining him from expressing himself on all political matters, irrespective of the constituency he represented, moreover while exempting others from the same restriction, amounted to a violation of his right to freedom of speech, as enshrined under A. 29 of the Constitution. Court agreed with him, but only in respect of those comments he made while in parliament.

Regarding his comments on Radio One, Justice Engwau held that the appellant, ‘… was on a frolic of his own when he made public statements during talks without permission from the UPDF Council,’ and had therefore rendered himself subject to disciplinary action, as a UPDF member.

In agreement with the appellant, Justice Kanyeihamba cited a number of cases in English history pertinent to freedom of speech of the Members of Parliament. For instance, he cited the case of King Vs Wilkes,[5] (though later overturned by Parliament) where the Court of Common Pleas had held that Members of Parliament were protected from seditious libel, as a privilege. He also alluded to another case where members of the public bombarded an M.P. with telephone calls, after a controversial question he had asked in parliament. The avalanche of calls followed a publication asking people to call him. The Committee of Privileges of the House of Commons found that this was a clear breach of his freedom of speech.

1.1.2        Separation of Powers / Checks and Balances

This case highlights the doctrine of separation of powers, and its relevance to Uganda, particularly the extent to which executive power can be exercised.

The Constitution establishes three arms of government: the Legislature, under A. 77; the Executive, under A. 98; and the Judiciary, under A. 126. It gives them distinct duties, because one of the cardinal elements of the doctrine of separation of powers is the requirement that no arm should interfere in the activities of the others. Prof. Kanyeihamba avers that separation of powers means that the three arms of government must be kept in three different compartments.[6] In this case, Justice Engwau observed that separation of powers means that the three arms must be independent of each other, and separate from one another.

The Constitution, however, also creates overlap, whereby the different organs may have a say in the functioning, and management of the other, thereby negating the absolute application of separation of powers in Uganda, by providing, instead, for checks and balances, in appropriate circumstances.

In this case, the President / Commander-in-Chief instructed the appellant to resign his seat in parliament. He (appellant) wrote a letter to the Speaker of Parliament, purporting to comply. The Speaker proceeded to act on it, and declared his seat vacant, without any investigations whatsoever; something which, according to the court, was done hastily. He sued, and court concurred with him that this was not effective resignation. The Speaker’s action was therefore bad in law. The President’s directive was also held to be unconstitutional. It was very wrong, and grossly irregular, for the President / Commander-in-Chief, and the UPDF High Command, to hold Brig. Tumukunde, an MP, accountable for the words he uttered before the relevant committee of parliament.

Therefore, here we see interplay of the three arms of government – with the judiciary lawfully meddling in the affairs of parliament. The judiciary’s involvement in order to correct the mess created by the legislature and executive is not separation of powers, but checks and balances of powers. The unconstitutional cooperation between the executive and the legislature (parliament), as exhibited in this case, is evidence that absolute separation of powers can’t and doesn’t exist at all.

1.1.3        Equality and Freedom from Discrimination

Brigadier Tumukunde averred that the UPDF’s action of restraining him as a Member of Parliament from expressing himself on all political matters, irrespective of the constituency he represents, while exempting other MPs from the same restriction, was a violation of his right to equality and freedom from discrimination. Court answered him partly in the affirmative, and partly in the negative.

Remember that Brigadier Tumukunde’s statements, which annoyed the military authorities, were made both in parliament and outside parliament on a radio station. As far as those made on the floor of parliament were concerned, court held that they were privileged, and so holding him accountable for them was a violation of his rights. That while in parliament, he is entitled to equal protection, and enjoyment of all parliamentary rights and privileges like other members. Justice Engwau held that, ‘Members of Parliament, including the appellant, were entitled to all the powers and privileges, including deliberations on all matters of national interest, during a debate or motion in Parliament,’ and that, ‘His decision not to support the Bill was completely privileged, and unquestionable.’

But as far as his comments made on Radio One were concerned, court held that the army leadership was right to hold him accountable for them. Justice Kanyeihamba said that, ‘As long as the appellant remains an active soldier, he also remains subject to the discipline and rules of the UPDF command, institutions and superior officers, only subject to the provisions of the Constitution, and laws of Uganda.’ For his part, Justice Engwau, said that, ‘The freedom extended to the appellant in Parliament did not rescue him against his controversial statements to the press, outside Parliament.’ He further said that the appellant, ‘… was on a frolic of his own when he made public statements during talks without permission from the UPDF Council.’

As far as the Electoral Commission organizing fresh elections to replace the appellant as MP was concerned, it was held that the Commission had done no wrong in so doing, because it had been notified by the Clerk to Parliament, of the existence of a vacancy, in accordance with A. 81(2). Court reasoned that like any other stranger, the EC could not have known what went on in Parliament, and could only rely on information obtained from those in the know, namely, the Speaker, other officers and Members of Parliament. 

1.2 Contribution to Constitutional Jurisprudence

A. 1 of the Constitution states that the Constitution is the supreme law of Uganda, and has binding force on all authorities, and persons throughout Uganda. Under the ultra vires doctrine, anything that is contrary to the provisions of the Constitution is null, and void.

In this case, the President’s/Commander-in-Chief’s directive to the appellant to resign from Parliament was held to be unconstitutional, ultra vires, and the purported resignation ineffective. Justice Mulenga found that the resignation was effective having been made with the appellant’s knowledge, but held that it was invalid in law because it was made against his will.

It follows therefore, that the decision of their Lordships serves to entrench supremacy of the Constitution, and the rule of law in Uganda. The principle enunciated here is that executive power must be exercised only within the ambits of the law.

Court pronounced itself on the controversial issue of army representatives in parliament. It noted that parliamentary army representation should be revisited by this nation. I entirely agree, because I believe the presence of the army in parliament contravenes the provisions of A. 208(2) which inter alia places on the army the duty of being non-partisan. It is well known that the army can’t be anti-government. Thus, army MPs have to side with, and vote for the government, in parliament. So, one wonders whether this is not tantamount to being partisan. In any case, if the army can’t vote in favour of the Opposition, does it mean that it doesn’t serve those opposing the government? It is my considered view that this negates the non-partisan requirement.

The idea of army representatives in parliament was first introduced in Uganda by the 1967 Constitution under A. 40(1)(c)(i) which stated that, ‘… up to ten members of the Uganda Armed Forces may be nominated to the National Assembly.’ I believe this was for purposes of political expediency, by a president who had failed to manage his army, and so resorted to pampering it, as a survival tactic. It is high time this pampering stopped, by nurturing a truly people’s army that doesn’t need any undue pleasantries to serve this country.

It is the province of the army to protect this country against aggression, but not to legislate for it. The NRM government today takes advantage of the 10 army MPs to amass numbers in parliament, so as to easily pass all its Bills and proposals – the fact that it has an overwhelming majority notwithstanding. The presence of the army in parliament is, as Professor Oloka-Onyango says, tantamount to ‘… use of military force to achieve political objectives….’[7]

1.2              Conclusion

This case shows that Uganda’s struggle for constitutionalism, and the rule of law, is not yet lost, after all. The court came out boldly to declare a high handed act of the President/Commander-in-Chief as being unconstitutional.

The independence of the judiciary in Uganda is still observed, giving reason enough to have faith, and confidence, that our judges can make decisions independently of even the most powerful among us, and that when they do, those in power won’t seek to victimize them, like Idi Amin did to Chief Justice Benedicto Kiwanuka: all this largely in a continent of leaders to whom criticism is taboo. The rule of law is still paramount in Uganda.

This, however, does not mean that as a country, we are where we want to be. There have been many attempts, in the recent past, of this very government, and President, to infringe or attempt to infringe, against the rule of law in this country. There is no assurance yet, that the government, and the President, will not repeat it. This therefore, calls for activism by all progressive citizens; and spirited litigation such as this, by Brigadier Henry Tumukunde, should be encouraged.

Notes and References



[1] Constitutional Appeal No. 2 of 2006 (unreported).

[2] See, Art. 77(1), of the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995.

[3] Cap. 258, Laws of Uganda, 2000.

[4] Ibid., Section 2 thereof.

[5] (1763) 2 Wilson 151.

[6] Justice Prof. Dr. George Wilson Kanyeihamba, Constitutional and Political History of Uganda from 1894 to the Present, at 298.

[7] J. Oloka-Onyango “Dictatorship and Presidential Power in Post Kyankwanzi Uganda: Out of the Pot and Into the Fire,” Rights and Democratic Governance Working Paper Series, Number 3, 2006, at 1.

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