Tuesday, 24 February 2026

Complaint on Evils in Judiciary Committed by Judges Wamala Boniface and Karemani Jamson

 BAKAMPA BRIAN BARYAGUMA

MOBILE: +256753124713 / +256772748300;

EMAIL: bakampasenior@gmail.com;

WEB: www.huntedthinker.blogspot.com;

Kampala, Uganda.

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Monday, 23rd February, 2026.

To:

H.E. Gen. (Rtd) Yoweri Kaguta Museveni,

President of the Republic of Uganda,

Office of the President,

P.O. Box 7168, KAMPALA.

Your Excellency,

Re:  Complaint on Evils in Judiciary Committed by Judges Wamala Boniface and Karemani Jamson

1.                 Introduction

“Let us dedicate ourselves to what the Greeks wrote so many years ago: to tame the savageness of man and make gentle the life of this world,” Robert Francis Kennedy.

The letter was duly served on HE the President and all other stakeholders, as evidenced by his handler's signature and the various stamps.

Mr. President, thank you for your good work in and for Uganda. God bless you. With great concern and broken heartedness, I report to Your Excellency a plethora of malpractices in Uganda’s judiciary, in your constitutional capacities of “Head of State, Head of Government … and the Fountain of Honour” as stipulated by article 98 (1) of the Constitution. I hope you find time to investigate these malpractices and take remedial action; and since judges are involved, I request that you put this complaint before Cabinet for advice to you in terms of article 144 (4) of the Constitution or proceed on it as you deem fit, in accordance with the law.

Before much ado, please allow me remind Your Excellency that I filed another complaint with you against High Court Judge, Elubu Michael, on Wednesday, 7th December, 2022, which unfortunately you have not yet worked on (a cover letter of the complaint is hereon attached as “A” for your reference; the complaint is accessible online at https://huntedthinker.blogspot.com/2022/12/investigation-and-removal-from-office.html). I request you to expeditiously dispose of that complaint, Mr. President. Why is it important to address complaints against wrongdoers? To encourage and promote meritocracy for mainly four reasons: one, to protect your personal legacy and that of the government you lead. Many years from now people will look back to your time in office and ask whether you did a good job while at it and they will judge you deservedly. Mr. President, after 40 years in power and leadership of our country (since 1986), the people we are complaining about are your products: trained, recruited and supervised by you. These are not colonial, Obote’s or Amin’s people. They are yours; and if they are of low grade caliber, then you take blame for it, as they stain and corrupt your legacy; two, to motivate good performers by punishing deviant characters. Surely it is unfair that those who serve well with integrity end up either the same or even worse than bad performers. We must make virtue fashionable again; three, to set an example for fresh entrants into and people aspiring to join the judicial service: good and honest service will be rewarded while bad and dishonest delivery will be sanctioned; and, four, to placate the aggrieved. Please hear out the complainants and give us administrative justice because the complaints avenue is the only one left and available in law to express displeasure and seek redress, as both government and the offending individual officer are immune from ordinary/direct prosecution for wrongs done. Now if you also render this sole avenue idle and inaccessible, who are you really helping or serving here? I think that only emboldens the oppressors, leading us to end up with a mafia judiciary par excellence; which, mark you, also makes you look bad, passing you off as also being heartless and mindless like these wrongdoers, taking pleasure in seeing the people of Uganda suffering at their hands by being denied justice; because otherwise why shield and protect them from accountability? Anyway, Your Excellency, please know that ineptness and impunity among some judicial officers is becoming too much, unbearable and intolerable. Being the fountain of honor in this country and also their appointing authority, please sort out the mess.

2.                 Background to this Complaint

In January 2023, the Law Development Centre (LDC) – oh yes, that notoriously cruel, oppressive, tyrannical, corrupt and Godforsaken institution – brought taxation proceedings against me in the High Court at Kampala (Civil Division). The taxation was handled by His Worship Jamson Karemani, who is now a judge of the High Court. So, my concerns about him in this complaint relate to him in his former capacity as Registrar, High Court, exercising powers of taxing officer.

The taxation resulted from an award of costs made by Judge Elubu Michael, ordering me to pay LDC for its costs incurred in my 2019 cause against it, which he grossly mishandled, as was well explained in my complaint against him that is alluded to above and referenced as annexure “A” hereto. At the start of taxation proceedings on Wednesday, 7th September 2022, at 12:00pm, before Registrar Karemani, I objected to the process by raising a point of law to the effect that LDC cannot recover its costs against me because its advocates, Musiime John and Mugira Kenneth, committed offences in the conduct of the cause by virtue of which costs are irrecoverable in law. I therefore requested that the matter be referred to a Judge of the High Court for decision and direction going forward. In reply to my preliminary objection, Mr. Mugira Kenneth suggested that since I raised the question of the legality of the award of costs as a ground of appeal in my appeal to the Court of Appeal, we wait for the Court to handle the issue. I did not object to this proposition because ordinarily it made good sense and in principle it was in my favour as it lifted from me the burden of incurring costs – even if only temporarily. Hence Taxing Officer Karemani Jamson took the reasoning of Mr. Mugira and decided that we wait for the outcome of my appeal and if the Court of Appeal allows, then taxation can be done at that time. Your Excellency, the God I love and serve saved me from LDC’s and Judge Elubu Michael’s burden of costs. In a turn of events, however, on Tuesday, 17th January 2023, LDC’s advocates met with Registrar Karemani, in a court hearing I did not attend, where it was decided that taxation proceedings proceed and that I file a formal application stating why the dispute should be referred to a judge. Mr. Mugira informed me of the Taxing Officer’s decision. I prepared a parties written consent for reference that is stipulated by The Advocates Act and The Advocates (Taxation of Costs) (Appeals and References) Regulations, which I sent to LDC’s lawyers for consent, but they refused to sign it. At the taxation hearing of Wednesday, 8th February, 2023 at 10:15am, I told Registrar Karemani Jamson that the advocates refused to consent for reference and requested him to make the reference to a judge on his own motion, but he also refused saying that he cannot identify issues for me. That was a flimsy excuse to give because he does not have to identify issues since that is done during trial before the judge. His (Karemani’s) duty was to make the reference for the reasons identified by me and leave it there. Anyway, out of frustration due to the impasse created, I asked him what I should do and he directed that I file a notice of motion. I argued that it is not provided for in law but my protest fell on deaf ears. He warned that if I do not do as he says, he will continue with taxation. He was somewhat hostile to me on this and the subsequent hearing of Monday, 22nd May, 2023. Eventually BOTH he and Mr. Mugira advised me to proceed under general provisions of law under sections 33 and 98 of The Judicature Act and The Civil Procedure Act respectively; and having nothing to do about it, I did as they said or else taxation would continue and a bill of costs slapped on me. With hindsight, I see that Registrar Karemani Jamson conspired and colluded with LDC and its advocates to deliberately set me on a wrong course in order to defeat my claim on a technicality when the matter goes before a judge for trial. It was all a choreographed mockery and caricature of justice.

3.                 Substance of the Complaint

“The level of unseriousness exhibited by some judicial officers is gross, unacceptable and injurious to the stability and progress of our country. It is not funny anymore!” Bakampa Brian Baryaguma, in the complaint to President Museveni against Justice Elubu Michael, dated Tuesday, 6th December, 2022, at page 2 lines 12-14.

When I filed my formal application in court challenging the legality of LDC’s bill of costs, it was allocated to Judge Wamala Boniface for determination; although to my mind now, for reasons as will be seen in the discussion below, the allocation to him does not look like a spontaneous and innocent exercise, but rather a pre-designed scheme where he gets LDC cases for him to issue decisions in its favour. Mr. President, I think Judges Wamala and Elubu Michael and Registrar Karemani Jamson are LDC-client judicial officers lending themselves to help clean, sanitize and quick-fix its messes, for a fee in return. It is a grand corruption enterprise. Why do I think and say so? Because it is logically inconceivable how an otherwise intelligent person can lend himself to debauchery, allowing to be stained with LDC’s stupidity and carry the stench of its foolishness, without some sort of reward or benefit obtained. Anyway, discussed below is the gist of my complaints against Judges Wamala Boniface and Karemani Jamson.

Relating to Wastage of Judicial Resources

Judge Wamala Boniface, at page 6, paragraph 13 of his ruling (a copy of the ruling is hereon attached and marked as “B”), observed that I should have appealed against Registrar Karemani’s decision staying the taxation proceedings pending the determination of my appeal in the Court of Appeal and quoted legal provisions to this effect. But those provisions clearly state that an “aggrieved” person should be the one who appeals to a judge of the High Court. So, to a sensible and discerning mind, the question is whether I was a person aggrieved by the decision staying taxation proceedings; and the short, direct and quick answer is, “No, I was not”, because the effect of that decision was in my favour and best interest. How or why? It removed/postponed the burden of LDC’s bill of costs on me – even if only temporarily. Look here, my primary and legal interest in raising the preliminary objection to the bill was to have it quashed/nullified. Therefore, ANYTHING that gave me that result or brought me close to it was good and welcome news to me; and accordingly, it follows that I cannot (and would not) have been aggrieved by Taxing Officer Karemani’s decision staying taxation proceedings so as to appeal against it. This is simple logic. I believe Judge Wamala Boniface is now sober after delivering on his assignment of frustrating my search for justice on behalf of LDC in his court and is thus able to look at things more objectively and fairly now: does it make sense to you, with hindsight, to say that I should have appealed against Registrar Karemani’s decision staying taxation proceedings pending the Court of Appeal’s determination of my appeal? I doubt. So your observation is redundant, a waste of yours and readers time and energy, a flagrant waste of scarce judicial resources in terms of ink, paper, manpower and time, that should be castigated and condemned with all the contempt it deserves.

On Exhibiting Double Standards in Deciding Cases

Also at page 6, paragraph 13 of his ruling, Judge Wamala Boniface described my application before him as a “mirage” for, as he reasoned at page 7, paragraph 15, “totally adopting a wrong or non-existing procedure.” Meanwhile, the same Judge (Wamala Boniface) allowed LDC to adopt and follow an outright, ridiculously wrong and non-existing procedure in the case of Law Development Centre v. Hon. Michael Mabikke, Miscellaneous Application No. 203 of 2021 (hereinafter “the Mabikke case”). Briefly, in that case, Hon. Mabikke filed a civil suit by way of ordinary plaint against LDC. The civil procedure rules stipulate that when someone files a plaint against you, you file a written statement of defence (WSD) and state your response to the case against you. But what did LDC do? They instead filed a miscellaneous application by notice of motion. This is a totally wrong and non-exiting procedure in law, within the context of that case. Yet Judge Wamala Boniface allowed LDC’s case, struck out a plaint through a miscellaneous application and awarded LDC costs in both the application and the main suit (i.e. plaint) even though LDC did not participate in it. Ridiculous!

Now, really, can Judge Wamala tell us under what law he proceeded to permit and himself do all these convoluted and chaotic things? So, to Judge Wamala, it is okay when LDC does a wrong thing willingly but very bad and unacceptable when I do more or less the same thing under compulsion, moreover forced by LDC. Oh wow! Your Excellency, I think we can agree that a judge who exhibits double standards in deciding cases of a similar nature is shameless, corrupt and crooked. You may think that he had forgotten what he did in the Mabikke case; no, he hadn’t, because I cited it in my submissions and attached a copy for his reference. So he does these things deliberately/intentionally. He is a very biased, unjust and unfair man, who does not deserve the title of “Justice”. By-the-way, it should be noted that the same advocates (Agaba Kenneth Mugira and Musiime John) were representing LDC in the Mabikke case. Apparently LDC and these two lawyers are very lucky in the court of Judge Wamala Boniface in the sense that he so readily accepts and entertains their trash and nonsense. No wonder they and their client, LDC, do not want to meaningfully settle this dispute out of court with me because they know that judges and other court officers are in their pockets doing their bidding and so they are assured of victory, however bad their case is – and it is really very bad. Mr. President, it is important for people to know and understand that not every matter or dispute should be argued or defended; liability in some (like in my ongoing cases with LDC) should be honorably admitted and settled amicably or simply left for the law to take its course and submit to judgement.

Anyway, this was not a case I should have lost on proper application of legal principles, before an impartial, open minded and fair court. In my submissions, I reminded Judge Wamala of the case law maxim in our jurisprudence stating that the rules of procedure, being the handmaids of justice, should not at the same time be used to defeat its ends. To buttress my case, I gave him five (5) good, concrete (and I really mean CONCRETE) reasons, supported with statute and precedent authorities, to overlook the procedural defect in my application and determine it on its merits. They were so good that any one of them would have been enough to convince an open minded and impartial court to agree and accede to the request. I belabored to give them so as to avoid accusations of not having guided the court in exercise of its discretion. The Supreme Court held, in the case of  National Union of Clerical, Commercial, Professional and Technical Employees v. National Insurance Corporation, Civil Appeal No. 17 of 1993 (hereinafter “the NUCCPT Employees case”), at page 7, that–

It is now settled that the existence of a specific procedure, provision or remedy cannot operate to restrict or exclude the courts’ inherent jurisdiction under … statute. Clearly the existence of a specific rule cannot override the statutory provisions … which gives wide residual powers to the court to prevent or correct any injustice. The question whether a court should invoke its inherent powers in a given case is a matter for the Court’s discretion which should be exercised judicially. The availability of an alternative remedy or specific provision is only one of the factors to be taken into account, but does not limit or remove the court’s jurisdiction. The issue, therefore, is not one of jurisdiction, but one of discretion.

From the Court’s discussion and analysis, the question of whether or not a court of law invokes its inherent powers or jurisdiction to disregard a specific provision or procedure provided by the law depends on what the demands of justice are. In most cases this power can be invoked if there is no remedy provided to an aggrieved party or where the remedy so provided by the law is not readily accessible to the aggrieved party. My application before Judge Wamala Boniface fell under the latter category of “where the remedy so provided by the law is not readily accessible to the aggrieved party” because the moment the court (Taxing Officer Karemani Jamson) joined/colluded with LDC’s advocates to frustrate me from bringing the query as to the legality of LDC’s bill of costs by way of reference under the specialized legal regime that addresses taxation dispute matters and instead advised and forced me to bring my query by way of notice of motion under general provisions of law, then the remedy/procedure of reference ceased being available to me there and then.

But Judge Wamala tried amateurishly and utterly disingenuously to bring my application within the ambit of the category of cases where there is a remedy provided to an aggrieved party in which case then inherent powers cannot be invoked. He did this by observing/suggesting/advising, at page 6, paragraph 13 of the ruling, that I should have appealed against Registrar Karemani’s decision staying the taxation proceedings pending the determination of my appeal in the Court of Appeal. But as already explained above at pages 6-7 lines 128-143, that remedy was not accessible/available to me because I was not aggrieved by the said Registrar’s decision and so could not appeal against it. I believe Judge Wamala had the NUCCPT Employees case in mind and was desperately trying to avoid being bound by it since being a Supreme Court decision it is binding on him, a judge of the High Court. Mr. President, it is  very absurd when a judicial officer (more so a senior one at the level of judge, sitting in a superior court of record like the High Court) circumvents the law for his/her own convenience and the benefit of his/her favoured party in a case. Also important to understand is that Judge Wamala circumvented the NUCCPT Employees precedent and dismissed my application on a procedural technicality in order to get a way of portraying me as someone who is stupid and ignorant of the law and legal procedures; so much that I do not know what I am doing. It is a tactic used by pro-LDC judicial officers to humiliate and dehumanize students suing LDC. It gets fictitious victories in courts against students: certainly that is what has happened with me twice now. LDC’s sympathizers use defaming methods to justify its continued relevancy and existence as being still needed to train ‘poor quality’ students who do not want to study and instead resort to court for shortcuts. These highly placed shameless liars will be exposed for the whole world to see and know them for the lies they spew and peddle from their high seats of power and privilege. Purveyors of falsehoods, as the Good Book, the Bible (Mathew 7:16-20) says, shall be known by their fruits.

To Do with Utterly Wrong/Improper Exercise of Judicial Discretion

Judge Wamala Boniface dismissed my application with costs to LDC. This decision is very unfortunate and absurd on the facts of this case. Here is why: I bring an illegality to the attention of court with incontrovertible evidence, the illegality is not disputed at all and is therefore proved, I attempt to follow the right/proper procedure to inform court of the illegality, but I am frustrated by the wrongdoer, the court (Taxing Officer Karemani Jamson) joins/colludes with the offender in frustrating me and both of them force me to adopt a wrong procedure or else I meet with dire consequences i.e. proceeding with taxation leading to possible imprisonment in civil prison upon failure to pay the taxed costs. Verily in such circumstances, no sensible and fair minded judge would make such an order. Much as costs are discretional, meaning that it is up to the trial judge to decide whether or not to award them, this was an utterly wrong/improper exercise of discretion. The award is unconscionable in law.

On the contrary, I am of the view that if at all Judge Wamala felt strongly inclined to dismiss my application out of probably the need to uphold the sanctity of legal procedures/processes, then this was one of those rare cases where costs should have been awarded to me, the applicant whose application has nevertheless been dismissed, at least as punishment to the criminals and saboteurs of legitimate and proper court processes (those being Mugira Kenneth and Musiime John who committed offences under the Advocates Act). Why award me costs? Because none of whatever went wrong was my fault; on the contrary, everything that went wrong was the fault of the opposite party (LDC) and ironically the court through the Taxing Officer, Karemani Jamson. But in awarding costs against me who tried to do what was right, Judge Wamala Boniface is effectively rewarding and encouraging wrongdoers in committing offences and abusing court processes. Your Excellency, it is very painful to wait years for a court decision that ordinarily by law should be issued within six (6) months, but when it finally comes after a long wait, it is a stupid ruling or judgment.

But there is a more hideous and sinister reason indicative of judicial sadism why Judge Wamala made this outrageously unconscionable order of costs against me: it is a cleverly designed trap to, one, ensnare me so that I may be imprisoned in civil prison for non-payment of LDC’s costs; and two, prevent me from opting for the cheaper option of applying for review of court’s ruling. You may wonder how or why I think so. Simple: since Judge Wamala did not dismiss my application on its merits but on a technicality, I have two options available to me in law to have his decision revisited if dissatisfied with it: review or appeal. The latter, appeal, is to a higher court, in this case the Court of Appeal. It is tedious, involving a lot of paperwork that makes it naturally expensive. Moreover, by command of the law, I have to pay mandatory shillings two hundred thousand (UGX 200,000) as statutory security for costs. Money I could have used more productively to better myself is wasted in ordinarily unnecessary and avoidable litigation. Very terrible! These are the people who deepen and perpetuate poverty in the world.

The option of review, however, is cheaper because ordinarily it involves little paperwork and does not attract statutory security for costs. BUT (and this is a big but, mark you) opting for review means that LDC would be free to apply to court demanding that I deposit security for its costs in case I lose the review case, failing which it (the review case) cannot progress to hearing in court – and knowing our courts very well, LDC’s application would certainly be granted. Now, here is the trick: the security for costs ordered by court in this scenario would be far much more than the statutory UGX 200,000 for appealing (it can even be 10 times more). This would give LDC the easy and perfect excuse to commit me to civil prison for non-payment of costs, as my review case also dies a natural death. So, to avoid this eventuality, the option of appealing to the Court of Appeal is the only viable one left to me. And in this lies the other motivation for Judge Wamala wanting to dissuade me from applying for review: that is, to avoid taking the application back to him because the law dictates that it has to be sent to him to review his decision. Clearly, this is another example of incidents where lower judicial officers abuse the availability of the appeal mechanism by dodging work themselves or doing it shoddily, thereby instead leaving the burden to their colleagues on the higher bench. There are words and phrases that aptly describe this behavior in one of our local dialects, the Luganda language: okukongola and okukola gadibe ngalye. Hence such people are bakongozi i.e. lazy fellows, needing to be denounced.

4.                 Conclusion

Our lives are not worth living if we don’t have our freedom. They may take our lives, but they can never take our freedom. What we do in this life echoes in eternity.

Your Excellency, Judges Wamala Boniface and Karemani Jamson are duplicitous men without honour. They are active enablers of the system of administrators and judicial actors who want to have me committed to civil prison. I know this because Mr. Musiime John threatened me with civil prison in the taxation hearing of Monday, 22nd May, 2023 before Registrar Karemani Jamson. These people see me as a spoiler for exposing, fighting and stepping in their plate (read LDC) from which they are profiteering by admitting students in large numbers, but failing them en masse, after charging/milking exorbitant sums of money from them; and so, imprisoning me is their way of getting at and revenging against me. The system itself is against me for challenging their beloved LDC. No wonder the Court of Appeal is denying me justice by refusing to give me a panel to hear and determine my appeal against LDC, thus risking rendering the case moot, since the Attorney General is moving to make a law that would permanently prevent me from ever becoming an advocate of the courts of judicature to practise my profession. I reported to and addressed Your Excellency extensively on this matter in my letter to you and selected Cabinet Ministers, delivered to your office on Wednesday, 21st January, 2026 at page 6 lines 110-118 and page 8 lines 165-174 (a copy of the  cover page of the letter is hereon attached and marked as “C”; also accessible online at https://huntedthinker.blogspot.com/2026/01/request-to-president-and-selected.html). Mr. President, I finalize by repeating my earlier request that you give Ugandans administrative justice. Please investigate and remove Judges Wamala Boniface and Karemani Jamson from our judiciary. These and other debauchees are creating an absurd system where a person who complies or attempts to comply with law and legal procedures ends up the same or even worse than those who sabotage legitimate court processes. This is unacceptable.

For God and my country,

 [signed]

Bakampa Brian Baryaguma

Mobile:       0753124713 / 0772748300.

Email:         bakampasenior@gmail.com.

Web:           www.huntedthinker.blogspot.ug.

 

Copy to:     The Hon. the Chief Justice

Hon. Minister for Justice and Constitutional Affairs

President, Uganda Law Society

Secretary, Judicial Service Commission

Proposed Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure in the Courts of Judicature

 

BAKAMPA BRIAN BARYAGUMA

MOBILE: +256753124713 / +256772748300;

EMAIL: bakampasenior@gmail.com;

WEB ADDRESS: www.huntedthinker.blogspot.com;

Kampala, Uganda.

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Monday, 23rd February, 2026.

To:

The Chairperson, Judiciary Law Reform Committee/Principal Judge,

Courts of Judicature,

High Court Building,

Plot 2, The Square,

P.O. Box 7085, Kampala, Uganda.

Your Lordship,

Re: Proposed Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure in the Courts of Judicature

Thank you for your good service to Uganda. God bless you, Your Lordship.

The letter was duly served on the Principal Judge and Chief Registrar as seen from their stamps signifying receipt thereof.

1.                 Matters of Serious Concern in Rules of Civil Procedure

I wish to bring to your Lordship’s attention, for consideration by the Judiciary Law Reform Committee and subsequently the Rules Committee, with the view of amendment, matters of serious concern in our rules of civil procedure in the courts of judicature namely, The Civil Procedure Rules, Statutory Instrument 71–1 (hereinafter “the Civil Procedure Rules”), The Judicature (Court of Appeal Rules) Directions, Statutory Instrument 13–10 (hereinafter “the Court of Appeal Rules”) and The Judicature (Supreme Court Rules) Directions, Statutory Instrument 13–11 (hereinafter “the Supreme Court Rules”).

My proposals concern the time for filing affidavits in reply under the Civil Procedure Rules and mandatory furnishing of security for costs under the Civil Procedure Rules, the Court of Appeal Rules and the Supreme Court Rules.

Since rule-making is the province of the Rules Committee, I propose that for the reasons given below, the Committee, whose work begins from the Judiciary Law Reform Committee that you chair, be pleased to amend appropriately the provisions identified hereunder.

A.               Concerning Time for Filing Affidavits in Reply under the Civil Procedure Rules

For a long time, the law and practice was that a defendant (including a respondent) must file his, her or its defence (including an affidavit in reply) within fifteen (15) days from the date of issue of summons. This position was recognized in many authorities notably the ruling of Justice Christopher Madrama in the case of Stop And See [U] Ltd v. Tropical Africa Bank Ltd, Miscellaneous Application No. 333 of 2010 (hereinafter “Stop v. Tropical Bank”) in which the learned Judge exhaustively considered timelines for filing of interlocutory applications, which timelines, nevertheless, applied to all other applications where affidavits in reply are required. Under that legal regime, an affidavit in reply was considered to be a pleading like any other (such as a plaint and a written statement of defence) and treated as such. The penalty for a non-compliant affidavit was striking it out of the court record with costs.

However, the legal position in Stop v. Tropical Bank has since been rescinded and replaced with that in the case of Dr. Lam–Lagoro James v. Muni University, Miscellaneous Cause No. 0007 of 2016 (hereinafter “Lam-Lagoro v. Muni University”) wherein Justice Stephen Mubiru rejected the practice of subjecting affidavits in reply to strict timelines, opting instead for the measure of a reasonable time before the date fixed for hearing. In the learned Judge’s words, at page 11 of the ruling:

An affidavit in reply, being evidence rather than a pleading in stricto sensu, should be filed and served on the adverse party, within a reasonable time before the date fixed for hearing, time sufficient to allow that adverse party a fair opportunity to respond.

As can be seen, under this legal regime, an affidavit in reply is not considered to be a pleading like any other (such as a plaint and a written statement of defence) and is therefore not treated as such. Further, the penalty for a non-compliant affidavit is penalizing the guilty party with an order to pay costs for the inconvenience caused. At page 11 of his ruling, Mubiru J put the position thus:

For that reason, an affidavit in reply filed and served in circumstances which necessitate an adjournment to enable the adverse party a fair opportunity to respond, should not be disregarded or struck off but rather the guilty party ought to be penalised in costs for the consequential adjournment.

But Lord Chairperson, to my mind, the departure from the Stop v. Tropical Bank legal regime (if I may put it that way) to that of Lam-Lagoro v. Muni University is not wholly desirable. Whereas there may have existed good reasons in Lam-Lagoro v. Muni University for rejecting imposition of strict timelines for filing and serving the affidavit in reply, I do not think it was wise to wholly rescind the fixed timelines stipulated in Stop v. Tropical Bank because, as will be seen in the ensuing discussion, that wholesome rescission will result in unjust and arguably absurd results in other situations. To appreciate this, probably one must compare and contrast the situation in Lam-Lagoro v. Muni University with other possible (and in fact real) situations elsewhere, as a case study of sorts.

The Situation in Lam-Lagoro v. Muni University

In Lam-Lagoro v. Muni University, it was explained and found that it was not possible for the respondent University to file an affidavit in reply within the then stipulated time of 15 days because some of the minutes they needed to annex to the affidavit in reply required approval at subsequent meetings of the University Council, which council meets at least once in three months as stipulated under section 42 (1) of The Universities and Other Tertiary Institutions Act. So in that case, the respondent filed its defence quite very late simply because it was impossible for it to file an affidavit in reply sooner than was done. Personally I think this is understandable and acceptable in the circumstances.

Although, as a matter of course, before accepting and enshrining this into some kind of rule of legal procedure, the Rules Committee would have to first study and analyse how similar situations were handled in the past since Muni University was not the first university to be sued and therefore necessitating a university council to sit and approve minutes to be used in the relevant litigation proceedings. Find out how other universities were handling similar situations.

Other Possible (and in Fact Real) Situations Elsewhere

Now let us juxtapose the situation in Lam-Lagoro v. Muni University with other possible situations elsewhere in order to test the desirability of the wholesome rescission of the legal regime in Stop v. Tropical Bank.

Lord Chairperson, to properly buttress my critique of the Lam-Lagoro v. Muni University legal regime, I am going to use my real life, personal litigation experiences to demonstrate that unjust and arguably absurd results will ensue in the currently prevailing legal regime. For this purpose, let me refer to two of my cases in the High Court, Civil Division, at Kampala. One is Bakampa Brian Baryaguma v. Bbaaka Property Consultants (U) Ltd, Miscellaneous Cause No. HCT-00-CV-MC-0033-2023 (hereinafter “Bakampa v. Bbaaka Ltd”), which is still pending before Justice Teko Isaac Bonny and the other is Bakampa Brian Baryaguma v. Law Development Centre, Miscellaneous Application No. HCT-00-CV-MA-0076-2023 (hereinafter “Bakampa v. LDC”), which has been concluded.

1.                 The Situation in Bakampa v. Bbaaka Ltd.

The respondent, Bbaaka Property Consultants (U) Ltd, was served with the notice of motion summoning it to file a defence. Bbaaka Ltd indeed filed its defence – the affidavit in reply – 53 days (one month and twenty two days) after service of court process on it, without explaining this inordinate delay. Bbaaka Ltd is a private company, with an ordinary board of directors, devoid of operational intricacies and challenges akin to those of a university council. No wonder it did not allege any plausible hardships that prevented it from filing its defence within the traditionally prescribed time of 15 days.

2.                 The Situation in Bakampa v. LDC.

The respondent, LDC, was served with court summons and pleadings that accuse its retained advocates of committing illegalities, fraud and engaging in professional misconduct during the prosecution of the cause from which that application ultimately arose. Any responses to or explanations for those accusations are well known and could be easily given by LDC’s retained advocates at relatively short notice. Yet they filed their defence (i.e. the affidavit in reply) six (6) months after service of court process on them! They invoked the rule and leeway created in Lam-Lagoro v. Muni University to explain away this inordinate delay. One wonders whether they also needed a council or committee of some kind to sit and approve of their explanation, if any, for engaging in the identified illegalities, fraud and professional misconduct. Definitely they did not and no such explanation was given.

Observations from the Foregoing Scenarios

Lord Chairperson, those are real situations, in live cases. The scenarios referred to are not exhaustive, but they suffice to illustrate my point. So, why should such parties not be held to strict compliance with the 15 days duration for filing an affidavit in reply as stipulated in Stop v. Tropical Bank? Speaking for myself, I do not see any good reason why they should not be so held to comply.

It is precisely for this reason that I hereby propose that the Rules Committee amends the Civil Procedure Rules to enshrine in the Rules the previous legal position in Stop v. Tropical Bank that a defendant (including a respondent) must file his, her or its defence (including an affidavit in reply) within fifteen (15) days from the date of issue and service of summons.

Exceptional circumstances like that in Lam-Lagoro v. Muni University can, if deemed proper, be recognized as exceptions to the general rule. The amendment should strictly consider an affidavit in reply to be a pleading like any other (such as a plaint and a written statement of defence) and treat it as such.

Provisional Arrangements

In the meantime, as we wait for the Rules Committee to do the needful and in order to urgently fill this lacuna or vacuum and avoid/cure possible injustices and absurdities resulting from its existence, I humbly suggest and recommend that the superior courts of record do utilize the medium of case law to fill the gap. After all, it is the same medium that has been used to create the current state of affairs. In Bakampa v. Bbaaka Ltd, I hope Teko J. takes this line of reasoning much as I did not present the idea to him at trial.

I so move and propose, your Lordship.

B.               Concerning Mandatory Furnishing of Security for Costs under the Court of Appeal Rules and the Supreme Court Rules

Mandatory furnishing of security for costs in civil appeals is stipulated by rule 9 (1) of order 43 of the Civil Procedure Rules (the exception thereto), rule 105 (1) of the Court of Appeal Rules and rule 101 (1) of the Supreme Court Rules.

Order 43, rule 9 (1) of the Civil Procedure Rules provides as follows–

ORDER XLIII—APPEALS TO THE HIGH COURT.

9. High Court may require appellant to furnish security for costs.

(1) The High Court may in its discretion, at any time after an appeal is lodged, demand from the appellant security for the costs of the appeal; except that the court shall demand the security in all cases in which the appellant is residing out of Uganda and is not possessed of any sufficient immovable property within Uganda other than the property, if any, to which the appeal relates. (Bold emphasis is in the original; underlined emphasis is added.)

Rule 105 (1) of the Court of Appeal Rules provides as follows–

105. Security for costs in civil appeals.

(1) Subject to rule 113 of these Rules, there shall be lodged in court on the institution of a civil appeal, as security for costs of the appeal, the sum of 200,000 shillings. (Emphasis is in the original.)

Rule 101 (1) of the Supreme Court Rules provides as follows–

101. Security for costs in civil appeals.

(1) Subject to rule 109 of these Rules, there shall be lodged in court on the institution of a civil appeal as security for the costs of the appeal the sum of 400,000 shillings. (Emphasis is in the original.)

Lord Chairperson, much as there is an attempt to ameliorate the potentially harsh and disastrous effects of rules 105 (1) and 101 (1) under the designated rules (113 and 109) to which they are respectively subject, by exempting an appellant from lodging security for costs where court is satisfied on the application of the appellant that he or she lacks the means to deposit the security for costs and that the appeal has a reasonable possibility of success, this attempt, I contend, is nonetheless not enough because it exposes the affected litigant to likely higher expenses in form of prosecuting the application for waiver of security for costs and even leads to loss of valuable time in the process. So in all respects, rules 113 and 109 are more illusory than they are useful in this regard.

On the matter of mandatory lodgment of security for costs, my view is that it is not useful to lodge security for them in some cases, like where illegalities are involved such that costs are awarded illegally and are therefore by law irrecoverable or where in fact there are no costs to be secured in the first place. In such cases, security lodged becomes utterly meaningless and really somewhat oppressive. Perhaps to see this, it is imperative to first appreciate the basics.

James A. Ballentine, Ballentine’s Law Dictionary (3rd edition), at 1155, defines security for costs as, “A bond, undertaking, or deposit required of a plaintiff to secure the payment of costs in the action or the unpaid costs of a prior action.” This definition to my mind succinctly captures the primary intention of the lawmaker in enacting the general rule in rule 9 (1) of order 43 of the Civil Procedure Rules, rule 105 (1) of the Court of Appeal Rules and rule 101 (1) of the Supreme Court Rules i.e. to secure the payment of costs of a prior action.

The imposing question then is: what is there to secure if the costs of a prior action are found to have been awarded illegally and are therefore unlawful and unrecoverable or that actually the person whose costs are being secured did not incur any costs in the prior action? The short and direct answer is: nothing.

For this reason, I propose that the Rules Committee be pleased to amend rule 9 (1) of order 43, of the Civil Procedure Rules, rule 105 (1) of the Court of Appeal Rules and rule 101 (1) of the Supreme Court Rules to cure the senselessness and utter absurdity inherent in them. I am fortified in this proposal again by possible, real life situations (some of them being my own experiences while involved in litigation in the courts) that render furnishing security for costs unnecessary, as explored below.

Possible Situations that Render Furnishing Security for Costs Unnecessary

Lord Chairperson, there are ample justifications for and indeed appropriate situations necessitating amending the impugned rules to move them away from their currently mandatory character to a directory one. Those justifications and situations include, but are by no means limited to, the following.

1.                 Commission of Offences.

Take, for instance, the aforesaid situation in Bakampa v. LDC at pages 5-6 lines 114-126 above, where LDC’s retained advocates are accused of committing illegalities, fraud and engaging in professional misconduct during the prosecution of the cause from which that application ultimately arose. The identified illegalities, fraud and professional misconduct amount to offences, by virtue of which LDC cannot recover costs, as enacted under section 75 of The Advocates Act, Cap. 295 (revised edition, 2023). It states as follows–

75. No costs recoverable for acts constituting an offence

No costs shall be recoverable in any suit, proceeding or matter by any person in respect of anything done, the doing of which constitutes an offence under this Act, whether or not any prosecution has been instituted in respect of the offence. (Emphasis is in the original.)

The cause from which that application arose, Bakampa Brian Baryaguma v. Law Development Centre, Miscellaneous Cause No. 428 of 2019, was dismissed with costs. Upon appealing to the Court of Appeal, I paid security for costs of Uganda shillings two hundred thousand (UGX 200,000), as required. But those costs are irrecoverable under The Advocates Act due to the offences committed by LDC’s retained advocates. So why secure them?

2.                 Non-appearance of Awardee when Summoned by Court.

Where the awardee did not participate in court proceedings, such as in another case of mine vide Bakampa Brian Baryaguma v. Attorney General, Miscellaneous Cause No. 129 of 2021 (hereinafter “Bakampa v. AG”). In that case, the respondent, the Attorney General (AG), was served with court summons to file a defence but did not file one. So court directed that I proceed ex parte. This means that the AG did not incur any expenses in the case since he did not participate in its prosecution.

Justice Nambayo Esta dismissed the cause without costs. One of the options available to me was appealing to the Court of Appeal against her ruling; and, of course, be required to pay security for costs – none existing costs since the envisaged beneficiary (the AG) did not participate in the case when summoned to do so! Lord Chairperson, this is ironic and quite frankly, also senseless and absurd. Why secure none existent costs of an absentee party?

3.                 High Possibility of Awardee Losing on Appeal.

Where an awardee of costs has no likelihood of success on appeal and is therefore putting the appellant to undue expense or great cost by prosecuting a civil appeal in which that awardee has no reasonable prospects of success, thereby raising a prima facie case of the difficulty regarding the success of the awardee, it is improper and unreasonable to subject the appellant to furnishing security for costs that will most likely be unavailable eventually.

For instance, take my appeal to the Court of Appeal (Bakampa Brian Baryaguma v. Law Development Centre, Civil Appeal No. COA-00-CV-CA-0186-2022) that is related with Bakampa v. LDC referred to above, at page 5 lines 102-104 and 114-126: the illegalities committed by LDC and its retained advocates raise serious doubt about their success in the appeal. Moreover, in the cause from which the appeal arose, apart from unleashing points of law, LDC did not raise any plausible defences to my accusations against it and so it follows that even on appeal, it does not have a good defence and is therefore not likely to succeed; and insofar as it refuses to settle the suit out of court with me, LDC is simply engaging in frivolous and vexatious litigation, considering the prima facie case of parties as revealed in pleadings.

So why should a well-grounded appellant be doomed to secure costs of a party standing on shaky and questionable ground?

4.                 Avoiding Ridiculous Outcomes.

It is ridiculous to furnish security for costs of a party that, for instance, engaged in committing offences in the prosecution of a case, did not legally appear to defend itself when summoned to do so and has no likelihood of success on appeal. Traditionally the law shuns upon ridiculous outcomes. It follows therefore that the same law should not be allowed to be ridiculous itself. Appellants should not be condemned to secure costs of parties whose case results are inevitably ridiculous.

5.                 Novel Points of Law Raised on Appeal.

Where the appellant’s appeal raises novel points of law not adjudged on by the lower court that have the effect of casting doubt upon the correctness of an award of costs, then security for costs of the appeal ought not to be furnished.

For example, grounds 1 and 2 of my memorandum of appeal in my appeal to the Court of Appeal (referred to above, at page 11 lines 257-259) state that:

1.                The learned trial Judge erred in law and fact when he granted prayers and an adjournment for filing an affidavit in reply to the notice of motion out of time, moved by a non-practitioner.

2.                The learned trial Judge erred in law and fact in accepting Respondent’s submissions that were signed by an unqualified practitioner.

These are new matters which were not considered in the cause in the High Court from which the appeal arose and which, in light of section 75 of The Advocates Act, vitiate LDC’s award of costs. This vitiation renders untenable furnishing security for costs of my appeal, ostensibly to secure the costs of a party who does not deserve them and cannot recover them legally, anyway.

6.                 If No Prejudice will be Suffered by Those for Whose Benefit the Requirements were Introduced.

As stated at page 8 lines 198-199 above, the primary intention of requiring payment of security for costs is to secure the payment of costs of a prior action. But if, for instance, it emerges that the costs of a prior action are found to have been awarded illegally and are therefore unlawful and unrecoverable or that actually the person whose costs are being secured did not incur any costs in the prior action, then no prejudice will be suffered by the intended beneficiary of the requirement for payment of security for costs if the security paid to secure those unlawful or non-existent costs is not lodged in court. In such situations, surely an appellant should not be required to furnish security for costs.

Observations from the Foregoing Scenarios

Lord Chairperson, the foregoing are clear situations where security for costs need not (and should not) be furnished by an appellant. The list is by no means exhaustive as there could be other situations. So why should appellants in such cases pay security for costs in their appeals? Speaking for myself, I do not see any good reason why they should be required to furnish security for costs.

My proposals are geared towards making the rules on payment of security for costs workable and encourage, rather than constrain, the culture of constitutionalism because those are special circumstances of a substantial and compelling character that militate against mandatory furnishing of security for costs, such that requiring security to be furnished in light of those circumstances would, to my mind, be tantamount to deprivation of the right to property, which is constitutionally prohibited by article 26 of the Constitution.

There is need to balance the interests and rights of parties in litigation to ensure that neither’s interests and rights are achieved at the expense or to the prejudice of the other. It is precisely for this reason that I hereby propose that the Rules Committee appropriately amends the relevant procedural rules which impose mandatory furnishing of security for costs namely, rule 9 (1) of order 43 of the Civil Procedure Rules (the exception thereto), rule 105 (1) of the Court of Appeal Rules and rule 101 (1) of the Supreme Court Rules.

Provisional Arrangements

In the meantime, as we wait for the Rules Committee to do the needful and in order to urgently fill this lacuna or vacuum and avoid/cure possible injustices and absurdities resulting from the current position of the law, I humbly suggest and recommend that the medium of case law be used to ameliorate the situation, by the superior courts of record construing and interpreting those provisions to be merely directory, but not mandatory.

I so move and propose, your Lordship.

Potential Unconstitutionality of the Impugned Rules

Before taking leave of this matter, Lord Chairperson, I would like to point out, as food for thought for the Judiciary Law Reform Committee and the Rules Committee, that the impugned rules are potentially unconstitutional, which fortifies the case for their amendment and provisionally their interpretation and treatment by the courts as being merely directory, but not mandatory.

In their absolute sense – in that they render payment of security for costs obligatory no matter what – the rules raise the question whether their requirements are in fact not unconstitutional, because they pose difficulties, contradictions and anomalies prejudicial to the enjoyment of constitutional rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, such as effectively stifling the constitutional right to go to the courts in which they apply rather than encouraging the enjoyment of that right, yet the Constitution gives the people of Uganda the right to have unimpeded access to those courts to seek appellate justice. Impeded access to the courts must be expressly and clearly stipulated by law, which the impugned rules do not pretend to be or do. In their absolute terms that impose restrictions to the right of access to the courts of their operation, which the Constitution itself does not provide for, the impugned rules are subsidiary legislation that are hampering people’s access to those courts and have the effect of amending the Constitution, thereby seeking to add to and or vary the same and therefore to amend it (Constitution) without doing so through its amendment provisions, thus making the impugned rules clearly against the Constitution and not in accordance with its spirit.

The question that arises is whether the requirements can be sustained in light of the fact that mere statutory instruments could be applied to deny access to constitutionally guaranteed rights and freedoms. The Constitutional Court faced a similar issue in Uganda Association of Women Lawyers, Dora Byamukama, Jaqueline Asiimwe Mwesige, Peter Ddungu Matovu, Joe Oloka Onyango and Phillip Karugaba v. Attorney General, Constitutional Petition No. 2 of 2003 and in its adjudication declared unconstitutional such legislations, mainly because of the hardship they cause in their application to human rights and freedoms cases, yet it is understood beyond question that: the door to the courts should remain wide open for the people of Uganda to have access to them at all times for redress in the event of any violation; the rules are subsidiary legislation which cannot prevail over the Constitution; rather, the Constitution prevails over them.

Lord Chairperson, I have examined the practical implications of rules 9 (1), 105 (1) and 101 (1) in their absolutist sense. Their role is to restrict access to the courts of their operation, acting as an impediment, a roadblock and a nuisance to those seeking access to appellate justice in those courts. They represent a continuing breach of the Constitution by legislation. Undoubtedly, the impugned rules exceed what the makers of the Constitution had intended and therefore have no legal effect in their absolute terms as they are inconsistent with and contravene the Constitution. There is urgent need to make the impugned rules workable and encourage, rather than constrain, the culture of constitutionalism by mitigating their harsh effects so as to encourage rather than discourage citizens’ access to the courts of their operation.

What is required is pretty obvious: the Rules Committee amending and provisionally the superior courts of record interpreting the impugned rules as being directory, but not mandatory. The Committee and the courts being the protectors of the rights and freedoms of the citizens must give such legislation and interpretation that will promote rather than destroy the rights. It is high time that the impugned rules are brought into conformity with constitutional standards. So much for this matter.

2.                 Conclusion/Way Forward

Lord Chairperson, in conclusion, I suggest the following as the way forward:

A.               Concerning the Time for Filing Affidavits in Reply under the Civil Procedure Rules.

I propose that the Rules Committee amends the Civil Procedure Rules to enshrine therein the previous law that a defendant (including a respondent) files his, her or its defence (including an affidavit in reply) within fifteen (15) days from the date of issue and service of summons. The amendment should strictly consider an affidavit in reply to be a pleading like any other (such as a plaint and a written statement of defence) and treat it as such.

B.               Concerning Mandatory Furnishing of Security for Costs under the Civil Procedure Rules, the Court of Appeal Rules and the Supreme Court Rules.

One, I propose that rule 9 (1) of order 43 of the Civil Procedure Rules be amended by deleting the exception thereto, so as to retain the general rule only. This deletion rids the rule of the undesirable mandatory element embedded in it and retains only the desirable directory element.

Two, I propose that rule 105 (1) of the Court of Appeal Rules and rule 101 (1) of the Supreme Court Rules be amended by modeling them along the general rule in rule 9 (1) of order 43 of the Civil Procedure Rules that is reproduced above, at page 7 lines 156-165. But in order not to procrastinate reading, let me reproduce it below, so far as is relevant for our purposes here.

ORDER XLIII—APPEALS TO THE HIGH COURT.

9. High Court may require appellant to furnish security for costs.

(1) The High Court may in its discretion, at any time after an appeal is lodged, demand from the appellant security for the costs of the appeal; … (Emphasis is in the original.)

This changes the character of the impugned rules from being mandatory to being directory by making furnishing security of costs a matter of court discretion. This implies that courts cannot require security without hearing both the interested and affected parties and then coming up with a balanced decision on the merits that caters for the interests and rights of all parties concerned.

I so move, Your Lordship.

For God and my country,

[signed]

Bakampa Brian Baryaguma

Lawyer

Mob.: +256753124713 and +256772748300.

Email: bakampasenior@gmail.com.

 

Copy to:     Secretary, Judiciary Law Reform Committee/Chief Registrar

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